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Fumagalli),2004, p. 111).2 Moreover, there is considerable evidence that cross-
border mergers tend to occur in waves (see, for instance, Gaughan,
2002; Gugler et al., 2003; UNCTAD's, 2004 WIR (p. 142)).
Despite the obvious empirical relevance of cross-border mergers
waves, previous literature has devoted very scarce attention to this
topic.3,4 In this paper, an international Cournot oligopoly model is
used to study the interplay between trade policy and the way merger
waves shape the industrial structure. In particular, we analyze how
trade policy can influence firms' choice between domestic and cross-
border mergers in a sequential merger formation game with a cost
structure à la Perry and Porter (1985).2 Gugler et al. (2003), in the largest cross-national comparison of the effects of
mergers to date, analyze a total of 11574 worldwide merger deals during the period
1981 to 1998. They find that roughly one fifth of the deals are cross-border mergers
(22%). In addition, their analysis shows that there is an upward trend in the percentage
of mergers which are cross-border (this percentage rises from 21.2% in 1991-92 to
25.5% in 1997-98). Interestingly, this upward trend is particularly pronounced for EU
countries, where the percentage of all mergers in the sample which were cross-border
rose from 24.2% in 1991–92 to 39.8% in 1997–98.
3 Two noteworthy exceptions are Neary (2007) and Salvo (2004).
4 There exists, however, a strand of the literature on Multinational Enterprises
(MNEs) that studies the choice between greenfield and acquisition FDI. See, for
example, Caves (1996), Nobäck and Persson (2002) and Nocke and Yeaple (2008).
Apart from discussing the relationship between trade policy and
merger formation, we regard the main contribution of this paper as
being two-fold. First, while most of the existingmodels onmergers do
not deal with the dynamics of the merger processes, as they simply
compare the pre-merger situation with a post-merger situation,5 this
paper considers a sequential merger formation process which takes
into account that a merger might trigger other mergers. This allows us
to study the formation of merger waves. Second, and perhaps most
importantly, we incorporate active Antitrust Authorities (henceforth
AAs) within our merger formation game. In particular, and consistent
withwhat happens inmost countries, we assume that whenever firms
plan to be involved in a merger, theymust notify themerger project to
an Antitrust Authority (henceforth AA), which can either authorize or
block the merger.6,7 The AA decision is taken in order to maximize
total welfare, measured by the sum of consumers' and producers'
surplus. In such a context, analyzing the optimal merger decisions
involves not only a standard merger profitability analysis, but also a
study of the strategic interaction between the merging firms and the
AA which is called to take a decision on the merger proposal.
A relevant question that should be posed at this point is what
should be the allocation of jurisdiction in merger control in our model.
Shall a merger proposal be reviewed at the level of a supra-national
AA (denoted SNAA) or should the merger proposal revision be
conducted by a national AA (denoted NAA)? We assume that there
exists a SNAA (say, a community-wide merger authority) in addition
to two other NAAs, one for each (member) country. The SNAA
examines merger proposals involving firms located in more than one
country and maximizes total welfare, whereas NAAs examine merger
proposals involving only firms from their specific country and
maximize national welfare (the sum of consumers' and producers'
surplus for national consumers and producers).8
We contrast two different games. In the first one, which we call the
laissez-faire model, following Horn and Persson (2001b), we analyze
the role of national and cross-border mergers as determinants of
market structure in an international Cournot oligopoly model. The
analysis of the endogenous determination of mergers is only based on
a profitability analysis and the merger formation game does not
incorporate active Antitrust Authorities. We depart from Horn and
Persson (2001b), however, in the way the merger process is modelled.
While in Horn and Persson (2001b) the merger process is treated as a
(static) cooperative game of coalition formation, where the players are
free to communicate and write binding agreements, in this paper the5 Exceptions are Nilssen and Sorgard (1998), Gowrinsankaran (1999), Fauli-Oller
(2000), Horn and Persson (2001a)), Salvo (2004) and Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005).
6 Antitrust merger policy and enforcement are very important determinants of the
structure of industries. However, as highlighted by Besanko and Spulber (1993, p. 2),
“the theoretical literature in economics has generally focused on the profit and welfare
effects of horizontal mergers (e.g. Perry and Porter, 1986) and has not emphasized the
policy-making and enforcement aspects of antitrust.”
7 Merger review in a dynamic context is also analyzed in Motta and Vasconcelos
(2005) and in Nocke and Whinston (2007). Like the current paper, these studies
investigate situations where the AA adopts a forward-looking review policy, i.e.,
forecasts the (final) welfare effects of the proposed merger given the fact that this
merger might trigger future mergers. However, in contrast to the current paper, these
two studies: (i) limit the discussion on mergers involving firms from the same market
(country); and (ii) restrict attention to consumers' surplus maximizing AA.
8 In the European Union a merger has national or community dimension depending
onwhere the sales are realized. In particular, a merger is national, and therefore should
be examined by the relevant Member State AA, if “each of the undertakings concerned
achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one
and the same Member State” (see Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of January
2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger
Regulation), Official Journal of the European Union L24, 29.01.2004, pages 1–22.). So,
by assuming that the AA in charge of studying a merger depends on the nationality of
the firms, we are implicitly assuming that, when a merger between two firms from the
same country is proposed, more than two-thirds of each undertaking's turnover is
realized within that country (Member State), while this might not be the case.
However, the analysis in Section 6.2 will suggest that this does not seem to be a crucial
assumption of the model.merger process is modelled as a sequential noncooperative game of
coalition formation. The sequentiality which characterizes the merger
formation will allow us to discuss not only whether mergers occur in
waves in equilibrium, but also how equilibrium merger waves are
formed. Since benefits from a merger are, by construction, large in our
model, the laissez-faire game will always lead to the creation of a
worldwide monopolist.9 However, market concentration will tend to
reduce consumers' surplus. So, in the second game, where we depart
from the laissez-fairemodel by introducing active AAs in the model, it
turns out that the formation of a worldwide monopolist may or may
not be allowed by welfare-maximizing AAs which control mergers.
The analysis discloses that the equilibrium market structure
depends heavily on: (i) the level of trade costs; and (ii) whether or
not active Antitrust Authorities are incorporated within the sequential
merger game. In addition, it is shown that whenever mergers occur in
equilibrium, they occur in waves and the merger wave comprises at
least one cross-border merger. Also, and contrary to commonwisdom
that trade liberalization induces waves of cross-border mergers, the
richer model where AAs are encompassed as active players of the
merger formation game shows that no mergers (and, therefore, no
cross-border merger waves) occur in equilibriumwhen trade physical
costs are at a sufficiently low level.
The intuition behind this last result is simple. Cross-bordermergers
have a positive effect on welfare since they reduce trade costs. In
particular, the international firm resulting from a cross-border
merger is able to avoid paying the trade physical cost since it owns a
plant in each country (the so called tariff-jumping effect of cross-border
mergers). On the other hand, there is an effect on prices: in this setting,
a merger always leads to an increase in the market price due to the
output contraction by themerging parties and this has thewell known
negative effect on welfare, the so called dead-weight loss. Now, for
sufficiently low values of the trade cost, the tariff-jumping effect of
cross-border mergers plays no significant role in the welfare analysis.
So, this positive effect on welfare is countervailed by the negative
welfare effect due to the increase in price, which in turn implies that
any merger proposal is blocked by the relevant AA evaluating it.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 introduces the basicmodel,
which is chosen as the simplest possible settingwhere the elements we
are interested in could emerge. Section 3 analyzes the laissez-fairemodel
where themerger formationgame is onlybasedonamergerprofitability
analysis (there is noantitrust enforcement). Section4 analyzes the richer
and more realistic setting where active AAs are incorporated within the
proposed merger formation game and discusses whether the full equi-
librium outcome of the proposed sequential merger game will result in
the socially optimalmarket structure. In Section 5we studyanextension
to the model with active AAs where the impact of different efficiency
levels on the qualitative results is investigated. Section 6 discusses the
robustness of themain results of themerger formation gamewith active
AAs, considering the case where the acquisition price is a result of the
actions taken by firms (i.e., is endogenous), a different rule for allocating
the jurisdiction in merger control, and a completely myopic merger
review policy. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
We consider an international oligopoly with four ex-ante identical
firms located in two countries, a national country A and a foreign
country B. Firms 1 and 2 are located in country A, whereas firms 3 and
4 are located in country B.
Basic model9 It is worth noting at this point that there is empirical evidence that mergers to
monopoly indeed occurred and played a very important role in the shaping of the
industry structure of advanced economies. According to Gaughan (2002), the first
merger wave, which occurred in the period between 1897 and 1904, featured a
transformation of the US economy from one of many small companies to larger
companies, sometimes monopolistic firms dominating an industry. For that reason, it
has been said that the first merger wave was a merger toward monopoly period.
The industry is assumed to be symmetric in terms of market
demand. We adopt the segmented market hypothesis, where firms
compete à la Cournot, maximizing profits by choosing sales in each
market independently. Demand is assumed to be linear, with the




where pj and Xj denote, respectively, price and total sales in country j,
and a N 0 is a demand parameter.
Following Perry and Porter (1985), we assume that what distin-
guishes firms is the amount of capital they own. The total supply of
capital in the industry is assumed to befixed,which is normalized to be
one.10 Let ki be the fraction of the industry capital stock owned by firm
i. In addition, let xij denote the quantity sold by firm i in market j.
The cost function of a firm that produces xi units of output, where
xi=xiA+xiB, and owns a fraction ki of the capital stock is given by11




where ki {1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1} and ∑i ki=1. Notice that the marginal cost
function is linearly increasing in output and rotates about the origin
as the proportion of capital owned by firm i (ki) increases or decreases.
So, in this setting a merger brings together the capital of the merging
firms under a larger resulting firm whose marginal cost is lower than
that of any of the merging parties for any positive given level of
output, thereby creating additional incentives to merge.12 In addition,
the gains from a merger are divided between the merging firms in
proportion to the stock of capital they each own.13
Assume that firms play a sequential merger formation game before
Cournot competition takes place in the oligopolistic international
market. The game starts from a status quo symmetric industry
structure where each of the four firms is endowed with 1/4 of the
industry capital stock. Two types of firms can result from this game:
national and international firms. A merged entity is national if it is
composed of merging parties which all belong to the same country. A
merged firm is instead international if it results from the combination
of merging parties coming from both countries. Assume also that the
physical trade costs associated with exporting one unit of output from
one country to the other are exogenous and equal t.
In what follows, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. Assume that aN19t.
Assumption 2. Only bilateral mergers can occur and each production
plant continues to exist after a merger.
The first assumption is simply to ensure that, at the status quo
industry structure, trade between countries takes place. With regards
to the second assumption, two comments are in order. First, the fact
that we restrict attention to bilateral mergers does not imply that
merger waves are ruled out. It simply implies that merger waves must
consist of a series of bilateral mergers. Second, the fact that each10 As pointed out by Perry and Porter (1985), this assumption rules out the possibility
of de novo entry into the industry.
11 This is a special case of the cost structure proposed by Perry and Porter (1985). A
similar cost structure was used by Vasconcelos (2005) to analyze the possible pro-
collusive effects of a merger.
12 It is important to note, however, that a merger in this setting “generates no
synergies” in the sense of Farrell and Shapiro (1990). As pointed out by these authors,
in a quadratic cost model à la Perry and Porter (1985), after a merger “the combined
entity M can perhaps better allocate outputs across facilities (“rationalization”), but
M's production possibilities are no different from those of the insiders (jointly) before
the merger” (p. 112).
13 In Section 6.1 we study an extended version of our (endogenous mergers) game
where the model predicts how merging firms split the surplus. The qualitative results
are shown to be largely consistent with the ones obtained when using this simple (but
exogenous and unmodelled) sharing rule.production plant continues to exist after a merger implies that in case
there is a cross-border merger, the resulting international firm is able
to serve the two markets without incurring any trade cost (this is the
so called tariff-jumping effect of cross-border mergers).
Let us now introduce some notation regarding the identification of
different market structures which can result from the merger
formation game. Let a market structure Mi be a partition of the set
of firms N={1, 2, 3, 4} into coalitions. Due to the symmetry of the
model and following Horn and Persson (2001b), the feasible possible
final market structures can be divided in the following nine categories
of market structures:
1. No merger: MA={1, 2, 3, 4}.
2. One domestic national merger: MB={12, 3, 4}.
3. One foreign national merger: MC={1, 2, 34}.
4. One cross-border merger without bias: MD={13, 2, 4}.
5. Cross-border merger with a domestic bias: ME={123, 4}.
6. Cross-border merger with a foreign bias: MF={134, 2}.
7. Two national mergers: MG={12, 34}.
8. Two cross-border mergers: MH={13, 24}.
9. Complete Monopoly: MI={1234}.
In what follows, we study two distinct merger formation models.
In the first one, mergers that increase the joint profit of its participants
will take place.14 In the second model, we study a richer (and more
realistic) game where in order for a merger to go through, it has to be
not only desired by parties, but also accepted by the relevant AA.15 So,
the equilibrium outcome of the proposed merger game depends both
on a profitability analysis and on the strategic interaction between the
merging parties and the AAs.
In this section, we follow the previous literature where Antitrust
Authorities are not incorporated in themerger formation game, butwe
depart from it in that we allow for a merger to complete monopoly
(see, for instance, Horn and Persson (2001b)16). More specifically, we
analyze a very simple sequential merger formation model where the
merger process is fully endogenized.17 In particular, starting from a
situation with four ex-ante identical firms, any two-firms merger is
allowed and themerger process follows the following rules. In the first
stage, firm 1 is given the opportunity to merge with its national rival
firm 2 orwith a foreign firm (say, firm 3). If firm 1 decides not tomerge,
product market competition takes place between the four firms in the
status quo industry structure. If instead firm 1 does mergewith a rival,
then, in the second stage, one of the firms not involved in the first
merger is given the opportunity to merge with any of its rivals. If the
game arrives at the second stage, we let firm 2 be the firm which has
the opportunity of merging at that stage, in case it was not involved in
the merger that took place in the first stage. Otherwise, firm 3 is the
onewhich has the power to decidewhether tomergewith a rival in the
second stage. Lastly, after this second (eventual)merger, there is a final
The laissez-faire model14 In Cournot competition, mergers are usually unprofitable with symmetric firms
and constant marginal cost (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983). However, it is well-
known that merger profitability can increase if costs are quadratic and firms are
asymmetric. These are exactly the two sources of merger profitability explored in this
(first) merger formation model. In particular, what introduces the asymmetry in the
setup is the existence of trade costs.
15 Some extensions to this richer model (e.g. endogenizing the acquisition price) are
discussed in Section 6.
16 Even though, in their model, whenever a monopoly makes a larger profit than the
aggregate profit of all firms in more decentralized structures, a monopoly would be
formed, the authors assume that a worldwide monopoly would never be permitted by
competition authorities.
17 Notice, however, that the way we model the merger process is different from Horn
and Persson (2001b). While in their paper, the merger process is treated as a (static)
cooperative game of coalition formation, in the current paper it is modelled as a
sequential noncooperative game of coalition formation.
Fig. 1. The merger game with active AAs.
18 As mentioned above, the SNAA examines merger proposals involving firms located
in more than one country and maximizes (global) total welfare, whereas NAAs evaluate
merger proposals involving only firms from their specific country and maximize na-
tional total welfare.stage of the gamewherewe let the outsider to this secondmerger have
the opportunity to merge with its rivals into a complete monopoly.
We assume that, at each stage of the game, the firm making the
proposal will opt for the merger that yields it the highest profits
subject to the condition that the merger must also yield an increase in
profits to the firms that receive the proposal.
Some additional notation must be introduced at this point. Let Πi,
MK denote the profit earned by firm i when the equilibrium market
structure is MK. The following definition will play a central role in the
identification of equilibrium market structures.
Definition 1. Market structure MK is said to be strictly preferred to
market structureMT by firm i, denotedMK≻i MT, if and only ifΠi,MKNΠi,MT.
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(henceforth SPNE) in pure strategies and the final equilibrium
outcome of this merger formation game is put forward in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. The final equilibrium industry structure induced by the
laissez-faire sequential merger formation game is a complete monopoly,
MI={1234}, for all aN19t.
Proof. See Appendix B.1. □
So, benefits frommerging in our set up are large enough so that the
sequential merger formation game always ends up leading to the
formation of a worldwide monopolist. It is well known, however, that
since mergers in our setting “generate no synergies” in the sense of
Farrell and Shapiro (1990), they will always lead to a price increase
(reduction in consumers' surplus). This suggests that we if enrich the
merger formation process so as to encompass welfare-maximizing
AAs in the sequential merger game, it may no longer be the case that
the sequential game will lead to a worldwide monopolist. In addition,
it may well be the case that the presence of these active AAs may also
affect the likelihood of an equilibrium with cross-border mergers.
These intuitions will be confirmed in the next section.In this section, starting from the same status quo industry structure
MA={1, 2, 3, 4}, our aim is to investigate how trade policy influences
firms' choices between domestic and cross-border mergers in a
situation where every merger proposal has to be submitted for
approval to the relevant AA. So, in this context, and as already
mentioned, the outcome of the merger formation game will depend
not only on a merger profitability analysis, but also on the strategic
interaction between potential merger parties and the AAs.
Three preliminary remarks are in order at this point. First, we
assume that there are no administrative costs that firms must incur to
submit a merger proposal to the relevant AA. Second, we assume that
whenever a firm anticipates that a proposal is going to be rejected,
then it does not even make it. Third, in the current section, both the
SNAA and the NAAs are assumed to assess themerger according to the
total welfare standard.18
Before Cournot competition takes place, firms play a six-stage
game with the AAs, involving the following sequence of actions:
• In the first stage, firm 1 is given the opportunity tomerge either with
its national rival firm 2 or with the foreign firm 3. In the former case,
it will have to ask Country A NAA (denoted ANAA) for authorization.
In the latter, it will have to ask the SNAA for authorization. If no
merger is proposed, the game ends and Cournot competition tales
place amongst the four firms.
• In the second stage, the relevant AA chooses whether to accept or to
refuse the merger proposal. If it does not authorize it, then product
market competition occurs between the four firms in the status quo
industry structure; otherwise the gamemoves to the following stage.
• In the third stage, if the relevant AA has approved the merger at
stage 2, then one of the firms not involved in the first merger is given
The model with active antitrust authorities
the opportunity to propose anothermerger.We let firm 3 be the firm
which has the opportunity to propose a newmerger with one of the
other two firms in the industry, in case it was not involved in the
previous merger. Otherwise, firm 2 is the one which has the power
to propose a new merger with one of the other two firms in the
industry. If no merger is proposed, then the merger game stops and
market competition occurs. If instead there is a merger proposal,
that merger proposal has to be submitted to the relevant AA for
authorization.
• In the fourth stage, the relevant AA decides whether to authorize the
merger proposed in the previous stage. If it vetoes the merger, the
merger game stops and product market competition occurs.
Otherwise, the game moves to the following stage in which a last
merger round takes place.
• In the fifth stage, the firm not involved in the (second) merger
proposed in the third stage (and approved in the fourth stage by the
relevant AA) is given the opportunity to seek a merger to complete
monopoly. If this firm decides not to propose a merger to monopoly,
the merger game stops and market competition takes place.
Otherwise, it will have to ask the SNAA for authorization.
• In the sixth stage, the SNAA decides whether or not to authorize the
merger to complete monopoly and, after its decision has been taken,
product market competition occurs.
The possible market structures that can arise when this (richer)
merger formation game is played are illustrated in Fig. 1.
Some additional notation is needed at this point. Let TWMK denote
total welfare under market structure MK. In addition, let Wj,MK, where
j=A, B, denote the country j national welfare (the sum of consumers'
and producers' surplus for national consumers and producers).
Definition 2. (i) Market structure MK is said to dominate market
structure MT from the SNAA point of view, denoted MKN SN MT, if and only
if TWMKNTWMT; and (ii) Market structure MK is said to dominate market
structure MT from the point of view of country j NAA, j=A, B, denoted
MKN j MT, if and only if Wj,MKNWj,MT.
Proposition 2 identifies the final equilibrium industry structures
which are induced by this merger formation game.
Proposition 2. The final equilibrium industry structures induced by the
merger formation game with active AAs are: (i) MI= {1234}, if
23.29t ≤ a b63.55t; ( i i) MH = { 13, 24} i f 19t ba b23.29t or
63.55t≤ab470.92t; and (iii) MA={1, 2, 3, 4} if a≥470.92t.
Proof. See Appendix B.2. □
This result is illustrated in Fig. 2.Fig. 2. Equilibria of thThe results are very different from the ones regarding the bench-
mark laissez-fairemodel presented in the previous section. Inparticular,
four important messages can be obtained from the analysis of Fig. 2.
Firstly, notice that whenever mergers occur in equilibrium, they
occur in waves. Secondly, the equilibrium merger wave comprises at
least one cross-border merger. Thirdly, for 23.29t≤ab63.55t, a wave of
three mergers occurs in equilibrium leading to a complete mono-
polization of the industry. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the
analysis reveals that no merger will occur for sufficiently low values of
the trade physical cost t, which contrasts with the common wisdom
that cross-border merger waves tend to be triggered by trade libera-
lization processes.
The intuition that underlies this last result is simple. When
evaluating the welfare impact of a given merger at the second stage of
the game, the relevant AA takes into account the relativemagnitude of
the two following countervailing effects induced by the merger. First,
since quantities are strategic substitutes, after themerger, themerging
parties contract output. Each merging party internalizes the negative
externality it inflicts on the other merger participants when it makes
its output decision and, as a result, the combined output of the
insiders decreases, leading to an increase in prices in market A for a
national merger and to an increase in prices in both countries for a
cross-border merger. Second, in case of a cross-border merger, there is
the tariff-jumping effect of the merger, which stems from the fact that
international firms are able to avoid paying the trade physical cost
since they have a plant in each country. This gain is clearly reduced as
the trade tariff falls.
Now, if we take the demand parameter à as given and consider a
sufficiently low value for the trade cost t, then clearly the second effect
plays no significant role in the welfare analysis performed by the
relevant AA. As a consequence, for small values of the trade cost t, the
negative effect on consumers' surplus plays a decisive role in that
welfare analysis. This in turn implies that, starting from the nomerger
industry structure MA={1, 2, 3, 4} and considering the cases in which
the physical trade cost assumes sufficiently low values, any merger
proposal will be blocked by the relevant AA at the second stage of the
game.
In concluding this section, let us compare the equilibrium
outcomes induced by our endogenous merger formation game with
the socially optimal ones. In order to do so, we investigate what would
be, from an ex-ante point of view, the SNAA first-best choice if it could
choose amongst all market structures that can result from the merger
game. The outcome of this exercise is illustrated in Fig. 3.
So, comparing Figs. 2 and 3, one concludes that the proposed
merger game introduces a distortion from the SNAA first-best
scenario. In particular, there exists a region in Fig. 2 where the
worldwide monopolist is the final equilibrium outcome, while MI=e game with AAs.
21 It is worth remarking that in a previous version of the paper the qualitative results
have been shown to be robust to the use of an alternative exogenous sharing rule,
inspired on the Shapley value reasoning. For the sake of illustration, take the initial
market structure MA and suppose firms 1 and 2 merge, leading to the final industry
structure MB. According to this alternative (and richer) exogenous sharing rule, firm 1's
share of the profits of the merged entity (firm 12) is the average of firm 1's incremental
contribution to the merger (i.e., π12,MB−π2,M A) and its incremental contribution when
entering the market (i.e., π1,MA−0). Therefore, firm 1's share of firm 12's profit if is given
byπ1;M B = 12 π12;M B−π2;M A
 
+ 12 π1;M A−0
 
= 12 π12;M B + π1;M A−π2;M A
 
. So, although exo-
genous, this alternative sharing rule takes into account the outside option of each
merging party in the division of the surplus amongst firms involved in a merger.
22 Predicting the split of the surplus amongst merging parties is an issue of utmost
importance which has been neglected by most papers in the literature on endogenous
merger formation. Twonoteworthyexceptions are Inderst andWey (2004) and Fridolfsson
(2007). Inderst and Wey (2004) introduce a model of takeover where (symmetric)
potential acquirers participate in an auction in which the target firm is allowed to set an
Fig. 3. SNAA first-best market structures.{1234} is never a socially optimal market structure.19 The reason why,
in the proposedmerger formation game, the AAsmay decide to accept
a complete monopolization of the market even if it would not be ex-
ante optimal to do so is simply the fact that they carry out com-
parisons (from the point of view of total welfare) betweenMI={1234}
and a subset of the possible final market structures.20 In addition, and
perhaps more interestingly, it turns out that a social planner would
not allow any mergers when transportation costs are (sufficiently)
low, just as in the equilibrium of the game with AAs (but differently
from the “laissez-faire” equilibrium).
In this section, we study an extension to the model with active
Antitrust Authorities introduced in Section 4, where the impact of
different efficiency levels on the qualitative results is investigated.
As mentioned above, our cost structure is a special case of the one
proposed by Perry and Porter (1985). In particular, the cost function of
a firm owning ki units of capital is:




where ki {1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1}, ∑i ki=1 and e≥0. In the previous analysis
we have assumed that e=4.








We analyzed the SPNE of the six-stage game presented in Section 4
for different values of e and concluded that there are two different
classes of equilibrium outcomes: (i) e {0, 1, 2}; and (ii) eN4.
First, for e {0, 1, 2} the results are qualitatively the same. In
particular, given a demand parameter a, the equilibrium market
structure is “nomerger” for low values of the trade cost t and awave of
two cross-border mergers for t sufficiently high. The next proposition
formalizes this result for e=2.
Proposition 3. The final equilibrium industry structures induced by the
merger formation game with active AAs and e=2 are: (i) MH={13, 24} if
11tbab155.37t and (ii) MA={1, 2, 3, 4} if a≥155.37t.
Extension:efficiency levels19 Even if complete monopolization of the industry is a priori forbidden, it is
straightforward to show that there still exists a distortion from the SNAA first-best
choice.
20 The equilibrium path leading to the complete monopolization of the market is a
sequence of two national mergers, followed by a third merger. The AAs then have to
compare the monopoly market structure with the other market structures along that
path; so they cannot consider the sequence of two cross-border mergers as an
alternative (which in the end turns out to be superior in terms of total welfare).Proof. Omitted. □
Second, for eN4 we obtained an equilibrium outcome qualitatively
equivalent to the one presented in Fig. 2 (e=4).
The difference between the equilibrium outcomes in the two cases
just described is due to the fact that in the first class of results (i.e., for
“low” values of e), the SNAAwill not approve a merger (between firms
12 and 34) leading to complete monopolization of the market.
Itmight benot completely clear, however, how this decision is related
to the level of firms' efficiency, e. The intuition behind this result is as
follows. In case e is “high”, total cost is high (firms are inefficient) and,
therefore, themarket price is also high inmarket structure {12, 34}. This
implies that in the pre-merger situation, firms are operating in the high
price elasticity region of the (linear) demand curve, whichwill make the
worldwidemonopolist resulting fromamerger betweenfirms12 and34
unable to raise the price too much. If instead e is “low”, the equilibrium
price corresponding to market structure {12, 34} will be low. So, pre-
merger, firmswill be operating in the region of the demand curvewhere
price elasticity is low. This being the case, after a merger, the resulting
monopolist will be able to increase price more than in situations where
parameter e assumes high values. Hence, the lower the value assumed
by parameter e, the stronger will be the negative effect on consumers'
surplus due to the increase in concentration. This explainswhy the SNAA
does not accept themerger between firms 12 and 34 for low values of e.
We can conclude that, regardless of the value of e, we have that: (i) no
mergers occur in equilibrium whenever the trade physical costs are
sufficiently low; and (ii) whenever mergers occur in equilibrium, they
encompass cross-bordermergerwaves. In addition, when the parameter
e is sufficiently high, it may as well happen that the final equilibrium
outcomeof themerger game is a completemonopolized industry. So, our
qualitative results proved tobe robust to changes in the level of efficiency.
A limitation of our analysis is the assumption on the exogenous
sharing rule: we have assumed that the merged entity's profits are
distributed between the merging parties in proportion to the capital
holdings of each participant, while it is more reasonable to have the
acquisition price as being a result of the actions taken by players.21
To address this issue we study a modified version of our
endogenous mergers game where the model predicts how merging
firms split the surplus.22 In particular, in this modified version of our
Discussion
Endogenous acquisition priceoptimal reserve price. A key result of their model is that if both insiders and outsiders
gain fromamerger, then the acquirer ismade strictlyworse off than anoutsider, i.e., a free-
rider problem between acquirers arises. This free-rider problem, which is exacerbated by
the target's optimal reserve pricing policy, leads to a takeover with probability less than
one. Fridolfsson (2007), on the other hand, considers a framework where mergers are
mutually excluding and highlights several mechanisms which lead firms to pursue
mergers that are harmful to consumers, i.e., anti-competitive mergers, rather than pro-
competitive ones. Key to his findings is the fact that the endogenous split of surplus in the
former type of merger is more favorable to bidding firms.
game, we assume that, at each merger stage, the firm who has the
right to propose the merger makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
chosen target firm.23
The qualitative results derived in Section 4 turn out to be largely
confirmed by this modified merger formation game, the unique
difference being that when the merger acquisition price is endogen-
ized, there is no region of parameter values for which the monopoly
industry structure MI is the final equilibrium outcome.24 The reason
for this is, however, easy to understand and it is related to the way
producers' surplus is allocated between the two nationalities. In
Section 4 the merger wave leading to complete monopoly is
composed of two sequential national mergers followed by a final
merger to monopoly. In addition, the distribution of profits between
merging parties was simply based on the “accounting” value of the
capital each participant brings to the table. Therefore, when BNAA is
called to decide (at node 7 of Fig. 1) on a (second national) merger
between firms 3 and 4, it accepts the merger for ab63.55t since it
anticipates that the merger process will end up in a complete
monopoly ultimate industry structure and the induced increase in
country B's profits (given by (1/2)Π1234,MI−Π3,MB−Π4,MB) more than
compensates for the induced decrease in consumers' surplus.
Notice, however, that when the producers' surplus is instead
distributed on the basis of the (more reasonable) “market” value of the
capital belonging to each merging party (as it is the case in the
modified game studied in the current section), then the opportunity
cost of the firm receiving the bid must be taken into account in that
distribution, which will obviously affect the share in profits of an
international merged firm going to each country. Take the same
merger proposal mentioned above (that in which firm 3 proposes a
merger with firm 4). Now, when BNAA is called to review that
proposal, it anticipates that if it decides to approve the merger and if,
subsequently, firm 12 bids in a take-it-or-leave-it manner for firm 34,
then the acquisition price at this second merger will be Π34,MG (i.e.,
firm 34's outside option), which is exactly the total profit earned by
country B's firms in case the merger process ends up in a complete
monopoly industry structure. This in turn implies that, in the revised
version of the model where the acquisition bid is endogenously
determined, the increase in country B's profits when we move from
market structure MB={12, 3, 4} to MI={1234} (now given by Π34,MG−
Π3,MB−Π4,MB) would never compensate for the induced decrease in
consumers' surplus. This explains why in the extended version of the
merger formation model where the acquisition price is endogenous,
BNAA makes a different decision when reviewing a merger proposal
where firm 3 proposes a merger with 4, ruling out a complete
monopoly industry structure as a final equilibrium outcome of the
merger game.2523 As the reader can easily anticipate, the main difficulty in analyzing such a modified
version of our model is to understand what is the outside option of the chosen target
firm (i.e., what would be its payoff in the continuation game in case it said “no” to the
merger proposal). A detailed description of the assumed bargaining protocol is
provided in Appendix C.
24 The final equilibrium industry structures induced by the merger formation game
with active AAs and endogenous acquisition price are: (i) MH= {13, 24} if
19tbab470.92t; and (ii) MA={1, 2, 3, 4} if a≥470.92t.
25 It is important to note, however, that we have also analyzed another extended
version of our merger formation game where apart from endogenizing the acquisition
price, we also assume that all merger proposals are reviewed by the SNAA. In that
version of the model, the final equilibrium outcome fully confirms the one depicted in
Fig .2. In particular, the region of parameter values for which MI={1234} is the final
equilibrium outcome remains. The intuition is simple. When called to make a decision
on a merger between firms 3 and 4, the SNAA does not care about the way the profits
are allocated when moving from the current market structure to the ultimate market
structure this merger will lead to if approved (it only cares about the increase in profits
in the continuation game if it approves the proposed merger). This being the case, for
some parameter region, the SNAA will approve the proposed merger since it
anticipates that the ultimate market structure this merger will lead to is the complete
monopoly and, therefore, the increase in global profits will more than compensate for
the decrease in consumers’ surplus resulting from the monopolization of the industry.Another limitation of our analysis is that we have assumed that the
allocation of jurisdiction in merger control in our model depends on
the nationality of the firms. However, in Europe, for instance, the
European Commission (EC) Merger Regulation makes a distinction
between mergers that have and mergers that do not have a
“Community dimension” depending on where the sales are realized.26
In particular, a merger is national, and therefore should be examined
by the relevant Member State AA, if “each of the undertakings
concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Commu-
nity-wide turnover within one and the same Member State”.27
We developed a modified version of our endogenous merger game
where the rule for the allocation of jurisdiction is the EU one. In this
modified version of our model, we will obviously still have the SNAA
deciding on any cross-border merger. However, as far as the two
possible national merger proposals are concerned,28 according to the
EU rule described above, theywill only be judged by the national AA in
case at least two-thirds of the sales are achieved within the country.29
The qualitative results obtained in Section 4 turn out to be fully
confirmed in this modified version of our sequential merger formation
game. In particular, there are equilibrium outcomes with no cross-
border mergers (and even no mergers of any sort), and equilibria with
two cross-bordermergers, but no equilibriawith just one cross-border
merger. In addition, low transportation costs are more likely to lead to
equilibria with nomergers. Therefore, the (admittedly simplified) way
we have chosen to allocate jurisdiction in merger control in our basic
model does no appear to be a crucial assumption in the analysis.
In the previous analysis it has been implicitly assumed that the AAs
were forward looking, i.e., whenever faced with a merger proposal,
the relevant AA was able to correctly anticipate the ultimate market
structure this merger would lead to. So, it is natural to wonder what
would be the equilibrium outcome of the proposed six-stage game if
instead the AAs were myopic. By analyzing a modified version of our
endogenous merger game where the AA which is called to decide
upon a given merger proposal judges it without considering that
further mergers might occur, one concludes that its full equilibrium
outcome confirms our qualitative results. It is worth remarking,
however, that in this modified version of our model there is no region
of parameter values where the final equilibrium market structure is
the complete monopoly. Remember that in Section 4 the merger wave
leading to complete monopoly is always started with a national
merger between firm 1 and 2. However, if this national merger
proposal is submitted to amyopic ANAA, it will always be rejected. The
reason is that the ANAA considers that the induced market structure
would beMB={12, 3, 4}, which is always dominated byMA={1, 2, 3, 4}
from a total welfare point of view. ANAA fails to anticipate that this
merger would be followed by subsequent ones and the resulting
ultimate market structures obtained in this process could be preferred
to the status quo industry structure MA={1, 2, 3, 4}.
EU allocation of jurisdiction in merger control
Myopic antitrust authorities26 Put it another way, the analysis above implicitly assumed that mergers between
two national firms had no “Community dimension” while all other mergers should be
reviewed by the SNAA.
27 See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of January 2004 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), Official Journal of
the European Union L24, 29.01.2004, pages 1–22.
28 In node 2 of Fig. 1, a national merger between Country A's firms has to be
examined. Moreover, in node 7 of the same Figure, a merger between the two firms
located in Country B has to be reviewed.
29 It turns out that in node 2 of Fig. 1,, the relevant AA is Country A’s AA if a b 56t, and
the SNAA otherwise. In addition, in node 7 of the very same Figure, the authority who
should judge the merger proposal between firms 3 and 4 is Country B’s AA if ab42,
06t, and the SNAA otherwise.
In this paper we use an international Cournot oligopoly model to
study the interplay between trade policy and the way merger waves
shape the industrial structure. In particular, we analyze how trade
policy can influence firms' choice between domestic and cross-border
mergers in a sequential merger formation game with a cost structure
à la Perry and Porter (1985).
Apart from discussing the relationship between trade policy and
merger formation, our main contribution here probably lies in the
attempt of going beyond a static setting when analyzing the effects of
mergers, and in explicitly considering the role of Antitrust Authorities
in a sequential merger game.
It is shown that the equilibrium market structure depends heavily
on: (i) the level of trade costs; and (ii) whether or not active Antitrust
Authorities are incorporated within the sequential merger game. In
addition, we show that whenever mergers occur in equilibrium, they
occur in waves and the merger wave comprises at least one cross-
ConclusionFig. 4. Appendix A: Equilibriuborder merger. Also, and perhaps most importantly, in a model where
AAs are encompassed as active players of the merger formation game,
no mergers (and, therefore, no cross-border merger waves) occur in
equilibrium when trade physical costs are at a sufficiently low level,
which contradicts the common belief that trade liberalization induces
waves of cross-border mergers.
We also identify conditions for the full equilibrium outcome
of the sequential merger game to result in the socially optimal
market structure. In addition, in an extended version of our basic
framework, our model is able to endogenously predict the split of
surplus amongst merging parties, an issue which has been neg-
lected by most papers in the previous literature on endogenous
mergers formation.
Appendix A. Equilibrium profits and welfare
Fig. 4
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Appendix B. Proofs
B.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of this propositionwill consist in seeking the SPNE of the
proposed game, following the usual backward induction procedure.
B.1.1. Analysis of stage 3
If the game gets to the third stage, two mergers have occurred
previously; depending on which merger has occurred, we might have
three possible scenarios which we discuss in turn.Fig. 5. Appendix A: EquilibriuScenario A. Merger proposal by firm 4
If (1) firm 1 has merged with its national rival firm 2 and, after this
first merger, 3 decided to join the merged entity; or (2) firm 1 has
mergedwith its foreign competitor firm 3 and, after this first merger, 2
decided to join the merged entity; then at the last stage, firm 4 has to
decide whether to join the already merged firms (M123), forming a
worldwide monopoly MI={1234}, or not to propose any merger
(NM) and remain in market structure ME={123, 4}. Making use of the
equilibrium profits presented in Appendix A, some algebra shows that
MI≻4 ME if ab395.2t. Therefore, in case firm 4 is called to play at the lastm profits and welfare II.
stage of the game, if 19tbab395.2t, it will merge with the firm resulting
from the mergers at the previous stages (M123), leading to the final
market structureMI={1234};30 if insteada≥395.2t,firm4will decide not
tomerge (NM), remaining in the currentmarket structureME={123, 4}.31
Scenario B. Merger proposal by firm 12
If firm 1 hasmergedwith its national rival firm 2 and, after this first
merger,firm3 decided tomergewithfirm4, then, at the last stage,firm
12 has to decide whether to merge with firm 34 (M34) forming a
worldwide monopoly MI={1234}, or not to propose any merger (NM)
and remain in market structure MG={12, 34}. Making use of the
equilibrium profits presented in Appendix A, some algebra shows that
MI≻12MG for all parameter values. So firm 12will decide tomergewith
firm 34 (M34), inducing a complete monopolization of the market.
Scenario C. Merger proposal by firm 13
If firm 1 has opted for a cross-border merger with firm 3 and, after
this first merger, firm 2 decided to merge with firm 4, then, at the last
stage, firm 13 has to decide whether to merge with firm 24 (M24),
forming a worldwide monopoly MI={1234}, or not to propose any
merger (NM) and remain in market structureMH={13, 24}. Making use
of the equilibriumprofits presented in Appendix A, some algebra shows
thatMI ≻13 MH for all parameter values. So firm 13 will decide to merge
with firm 24 (M24), inducing a complete monopolization of themarket.
B.1.2. Analysis of stage 2
If the game arrives at the second stage, then a merger involving
firm 1 has occurred at the first stage. In addition, the specific subgame
which is played at the second stage depends obviously on which firm
merged with firm 1 at that first stage of the game. Two different
scenarios should be distinguished, which we discuss in turn.
Scenario 1. Merger proposal by firm 3
If firm 1 has merged with its national rival firm 2 at the previous
stage, then, at the second stage, firm 3 has to decide between the
following three different options: (i) do not merge (NM) and remain in
the industry structure MB={12, 3, 4}; (ii) merge with the merged
entity which resulted from the previous merger stage (M12), inducing
a final market structure of the type ME={123, 4} if a≥395.2t, and MI=
{1234} if 19tbab395.2t; and (iii) merge with firm 4 (M4), the other
outsider of the previous merger, leading to a final market structure of
the type MI={1234}. Making use of the equilibrium profits presented
in Appendix A, simple algebra shows that MI≻3 MB and MI≻3 ME for
all parameter values. Moreover, we derive that ME≻3 MB if ab2937,
035t. Therefore, in case firm 3 is called to play at the second stage of
the game, it will go for the complete monopolization of the market
MI={1234}. This industry structure can be achieved, for all parameter
values, by choosing strategy M4 (at stage 2).
Scenario 2. Merger proposal by firm 2
If firm 1 opted for a cross-border merger (with firm 3) at the first
stage, then the firmwhich has to take a merger decision at the second30 As mentioned above, at each merger round, we check whether the firm receiving
the merger proposal – in this specific case, firm 123 – has the incentive to merge with
the firm making the proposal (in this case, firm 4).
31 It might seem counterintuitive to observe that a firm having the opportunity to
merge to complete monopoly decides not to take this opportunity and decides to
operate alone in the market facing a big and more efficient competitor. Notice,
however, that this happens for large values of the demand parameter a. The higher the
value of a is, the more severe is going to be output restriction by insiders (of the
previous mergers). This in turn implies that the higher a is, the larger will be the free-
riding profits for the outsider — firm 4. This result depends crucially on the
(exogenous) way we model the split of surplus inside the merged entity. In the
modified version of the merger formation game studied in Section 6.1, where the
acquisition bid is endogenized, this counterintuitive result does not anymore hold.stage is firm 2. This firm can take three different decisions: (i) do not
merge (NM) and remain at the market structure MD={13, 2, 4}; (ii)
merge with the merged entity resulting from the merger at stage 1
(M13), leading to the market structure ME={123, 4} if a≥395.2t, and
MI={1234} if 19tbab395.2t; and (iii) mergewith firm 4 (M4), inducing
a final market structure of the type MI={1234}. Using the equilibrium
profits presented in Appendix A, we can derive that MI≻2 MD and
MI≻2 ME for all parameter values. Hence, the behavior of firm 2, when
it is called to make a merger decision at stage 2, is to choose a strategy
leading to complete monopolization of the market, MI={1234}. This
can be implemented, for all parameter values, by choosing M4.
B.1.3. Analysis of stage 1
At the first stage, firm 1 has three different options: (i) do not
merge (NM) and remain in the industry structure MA={1, 2, 3, 4}; (ii)
merge with the national competitor (M2), inducing a final market
structure of the type MI={1234}; and (iii) embark on a cross-border
merger (M3), leading to a final market structure of the type MI=
{1234}. Given the equivalence between the two merging options, we
can summarize firm 1's choice as to decide whether or not to merge.
Simple algebra shows that, for all aN19t (Assumption 1), MI≻1 MA.
So, firm 1, at the first stage of the game, will always choose to merge,
inducing a complete monopolization of the market. This completes
the proof of Proposition 1.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of this result will consist in seeking the SPNE of the
proposed game, proceeding by solving it by backward induction.
B.2.1. Analysis of stage 6
If the game arrives at the sixth stage, then the SNAA has to decide
whether or not to allow a merger between the two remaining firms in
the industry leading to a complete monopolization of the industry,
MI={1234}. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the SNAA can face a merger to
monopoly proposal in three different situations, which we discuss in
turn.
First, the SNAA might have to decide on a proposal by firm 4 to
merge with firm 123. Since MIN SN ME only if ab27.98t, the SNAA will
authorize this merger if ab27.98t and will veto it otherwise.32
Second, the SNAA might have to decide on a merger involving two
national monopolists towards complete monopolization of the
industry. Some algebra shows that MIN SN MG only when ab127.93t.
Hence, this merger to monopoly will be approved when ab127.93t
and rejected otherwise.
Lastly, the SNAAmight be called to decide on amerger between two
international firms, resulting from two previous cross-bordermergers.
Some algebra shows, however, that, for all parameter values, the total
welfare in the completemonopolyMI={1234} is always lower than the
total welfare associatedwithmarket structureMH={13, 24},MHN SNMI.
Hence, after a wave of two cross-border mergers, the SNAA will never
authorize a further merger to complete monopoly.3332 It may not be completely clear why the AA can decide to accept a merger proposal
that would lead to the complete monopoly market structure MI. The intuition for this
result is as follows. In such a merger, we have different aspects affecting total welfare.
On the one hand, there is a negative impact on welfare due to the fact that the merged
entity contracts output so as to increase the market price, therefore reducing
consumers’ surplus. On the other hand, welfare is enhanced because of the tariff-
jumping effect. When t=0, if there is a merger to complete monopoly, the negative
impact of the merger on consumers' surplus is not compensated by any positive effect
as the tariff-jumping argument does not apply. Now, as t increases, the merger has a
positive impact on welfare as it implies the cost reduction associated with the tariff-
jumping. Notice that the magnitude of this positive effect is increasing in t. So, for
sufficiently high values of t, the SNAA realizes that a merger to complete monopoly is
welfare enhancing.
33 This is due to the fact that the tariff-jumping argument does not apply to this
specific merger since the two firms in market structure MH are both international.
34 It is worth comparing this choice of the SNAA with the decision it has to make in
case firm 3 proposes a merger with firm 12, which has been analyzed in the first part of
the discussion regarding stage 4. In that case, both merging parties are national and so
both benefit from the tariff-jumping effect of the merger. In the present case, however,
we have an already international firm merging with a national one, so the tariff-
jumping effect applies only to firm 2. As a consequence, in the case under analysis, the
tariff-jumping effect is only a “partial” effect which turns out not to compensate for the
increase in price.B.2.2. Analysis of stage 5
If the game arrives at the fifth stage, a duopolistic structure has
emerged from the previous stages of the game, and the firm not
involved in the most recent of the previous mergers has to decide
whether or not to seek a merger to monopoly. We will again have to
distinguish three cases.
First, if firm 4was not involved in any of the previousmergers, then
it can decide at this stage either not to propose any further merger,
and remain at market structure ME={123, 4}, or to propose a merger
with firm 123. Simple algebra shows that MI≻4 ME if ab395.2195t.
However, from the previous analysis, the SNAA will approve such a
merger only if ab27.98t. Hence, firm 4will decide to propose a merger
to monopoly if ab27.98t and will propose no merger otherwise.
Second, if there was a wave of mergers creating two national
monopolies, then firm 12 (the national monopoly created by the first
merger) has to decide whether to seek a merger leading to a complete
monopoly. It is easy to show that this firm always prefers to be in a
complete monopoly market structure than in a market structure
composed of two national monopolies, MI≻12 MG for all parameter
values. However, firm 12 anticipates its merger proposal to monopoly
will only be accepted by the SNAA if ab127.93t. Hence, the firm seeks
a merger to complete monopoly only if ab127.93t.
Lastly, if a wave of cross-border mergers occurred in the previous
stages of the game, then the first international firm created by this
wave – firm 13 – anticipates that the SNAA will never approve a
further merger to complete monopoly. For this reason, firm 13 will not
make any merger proposal.
B.2.3. Analysis of stage 4
In the fourth stage, the relevant AA has to decide whether to accept
a merger proposed by one of the outsiders to the first merger. Four
different cases must be considered here: two cases in which the
merger is proposed by firm 3 and two other cases inwhich the merger
is proposed by firm 2. These cases are analyzed in what follows.
First, in case the outsider to the first merger is firm 3 and it
proposed a merger with the merged entity which resulted from the
previous merger (M12), then the merger proposal is reviewed by the
SNAA. The SNAA anticipates that if it approves the merger proposal,
then there are two different possible scenarios regarding the
evolution of the merger formation process: (i) If ab27.98t, then this
merger will be followed by a subsequent merger leading to a complete
monopoly market structure MI={1234}; and (ii) If instead a≥27.98t,
then this merger will not be followed by another merger (and the
inducedmarket structurewill therefore beME={123, 4}). If themerger
is not approved, the final market structure will beMB={12, 3, 4}. Now,
some algebra shows that MEN SN MB if ab244.481t and MIN SN MB if
ab107.09t. So, the SNAA will decide to approve the merger if
ab244.481t and to veto it otherwise.
Second, if the outsider to thefirstmerger isfirm3and it proposed to
mergewith firm 4 (M4), then the merger proposal should be reviewed
by Country B NAA (denoted BNAA). If the merger is rejected, the final
market structure will be MB={12, 3, 4}. If however the merger is
approved, then BNAA anticipates that: (i) If ab127.93t, thismerger will
be followed by a subsequent one leading to complete monopolization
of the industry; and (ii) If instead a≥127.93t, then this merger will not
be followed by other merger and the final industry structure will be
composed of two national monopolies, MG={12, 34}. Simple algebra
shows that MBNB MG for all parameter values and MINB MB only if
ab63.55t. So, BNAAwill decide to approve the merger (expecting that
the merger process will end up in a complete monopoly ultimate
market structure) if ab63.55t and reject the merger otherwise (in
which case the final industry structure is MB={12, 3, 4}).
Third, in case the outsider to the first merger is firm 2 and it
proposed to merge with the merged entity resulting from the first
merger (M13), then the SNAA is called to make a decision on this
merger proposal. The SNAA knows that if it rejects the merger, theinduced final market structure is going to be MD={13, 2, 4}. It also
anticipates that when it accepts the merger, two different cases can
occur: (i) if ab27.98t, then the merger under analysis will be followed
by a subsequent one leading to market structureMI={1234}; and (ii) if
instead a≥27.98t, the merger will not be followed by a subsequent
merger, which implies that the final market structure will be ME=
{123, 4}. Moreover, simple algebra shows that, for all parameter
values, MDN SN ME and MDN SN MI, which in turn implies that it is
optimal for the SNAA is to (always) reject the merger proposal under
analysis. A merger involving firms 13 and firm 2 would induce the
creation a larger international firm yielding a “partial” tariff-jumping
effect,34 but the loss in consumers' surplus resulting from the output
contraction (so as to raise price) by themerged entity wouldmake this
merger welfare detrimental.
Lastly, if the outsider to the first merger is firm 2 and if this firm
proposed to merge with firm 4 (M4), then it is again the SNAA that has
to make a decision on the merger proposal. The SNAA knows that if it
accepts the merger, then the induced final market structure is MH=
{13, 24}, whereas if it rejects it the merger game stops and the
equilibrium industry structure is MD={13, 2, 4}. Since MHN SN MD if
ab479.34t, the SNAA will approve the cross-border merger between
firms 2 and 4 in this specific region of parameter values and will reject
it otherwise.
B.2.4. Analysis of stage 3
In the third stage, we have to check whether the outsider to the
first merger will use the opportunity to propose a subsequent merger
or not. We have to consider two different cases.
First, consider the case where a merger between firm 1 and 2 has
previously occurred; firm 3 has now the opportunity to propose a new
merger. Firm 3's preferences over the ultimate market structures its
decision may lead to are as follows: (1) for all parameter values, MI≻3
MB and MI≻3 ME and (2) ME≻3 MB if ab2937.035t. Hence, firm 3, if
called to play at stage 3, will take the following decisions:
□ If ab27.98t, then firm 3 is indifferent between merging with firm
12 (M12) or merging with firm 4 (M4) since in both cases the
ultimate market structure the merger will lead to is MI={1234}.
□ If 27.98t≤ab63.55t, firm 3 decides to merge with firm 4 and the
ultimate market structure this merger will lead to is again the
complete monopoly one, MI={1234}.
□ If 63.55t≤ab244.481t, then firm 3 decides to merge with the
merged entity resulting from the previous merger round (M12)
and the induced market structure is ME={123, 4} since no further
merger would be proposed along the equilibrium path.
□ If instead a≥244.481t, thenfirm3 anticipates that nomergerwould
be approved by the relevant AA in the following stage of the game
and, therefore, decides not to propose a merger at this stage, which
in turn implies that the final market structure is MB={12, 3, 4}.
Second, suppose a merger between firms 1 and 3 has occurred,
then firm 2 has the opportunity to propose another merger. Notice
that, as explained above, a merger with firm 13 (M13) would never be
approved by the SNAA in the following stage of the game, which
means that, at this stage, firm 2's decision amounts to a decision on
whether or not to mergewith firm 4. Simple algebra shows that, for all
parameter values, firm 2 strictly prefers market structure MH to
market structure MD, MH≻2 MD. As a result, it is very easy to conclude
that firm 2 will only decide to propose a merger with firm 4 at stage 3
35 For instance, at node 3 of Fig. 1, firm 3 has to decide between: (i) no merger
proposal (NM), (ii) merge with firm 12 (M12); and (iii) merge with firm 4 (M4).if ab479.34t. This merger would not be followed by a subsequent
merger to complete monopoly, which means that the final industry
structure would be composed of two international firms with one half
of the industry capital each (resulting from awave of two cross-border
mergers), MH={13, 24}.
B.2.5. Analysis of stage 2
In the second stage, in case firm 1 decided to submit amerger at the
previous stage, the relevant AA is called to make a decision on the
merger proposal. Two separate cases should be considered, depending
on whether firm 1 decided to propose a merger with its national rival
firm 2 or with foreign firm 3.
First, in case firm 1 proposed a merger with firm 2, then ANAA is
called to make a decision at stage 2. ANAA anticipates that if it
approves the merger, then there are three possible induced final
market structures this merger will lead to: MI={1234} (for ab63.55t),
ME={123, 4} (for 63.55t≤ab244.481t), and MB={12, 3, 4} (for a≥
244.481t). Now, comparing each of these possible market structures
with the initial one (MA={1, 2, 3, 4}) in terms of (country A) national
welfare, one has that: (1) MANA MB for all parameter values; (2) MENA
MA if 34.27tbab93.65t; and (3) MINA MA if 23.29tbab84.50t. As a
result, if called to play at stage 2, ANAA will decide as follows:
□ Accept the merger if 23.29tbab93.65t, where in anticipates that
the ultimatemarket structure this merger will lead to isMI={1234}
when 23.29tbab63.55t and ME when 63.55tbab93.65t.
□ Reject the merger otherwise.
Second, in case firm 1 proposed a merger with firm 3, then this
merger is reviewed by the SNAA at stage 2. The SNAA anticipates that
if it approves the merger, then this merger can induce two possible
final market structures: MH={13, 24} if ab479.34t, or MD={13, 2, 4}
otherwise. Comparing now these two possible final market structures
with the initial one (MA={1, 2, 3, 4}) in terms of total welfare, one may
conclude that: (1) MHN SN MA if ab470.92t; and (2) MDN SN MA if
ab462.79t. Hence, the SNAA will decide to approve the merger
(anticipating that the ultimate market structure this merger will lead
to is MH={13, 24}) if ab470.92t and will veto it otherwise.
B.2.6. Analysis of stage 1
In the first stage of the game, firm 1 is given the opportunity to
propose a merger either with its national rival firm 2 or with the
foreign firm 3. This firm may, however, decide not to propose any
merger.
If firm 1 proposes a merger with firm 2, then it anticipates that
there are three possible final induced market structures this merger
will lead to: (1) MI={1234} if 23.29tbab63.55t, (2) ME={123, 4} if
63.55tbab93.65t and (3) MA={1, 2, 3, 4} otherwise. If instead firm 1
proposes a merger with firm 3, it anticipates that, as explained above,
this merger will only be accepted by the SNAA if ab470.92t and it will
be followed by a subsequent cross-border merger (by firms 2 and 4)
leading to the final market structure MH={13, 24}.
Now, studying firm 1's preferences over the possible final induced
market structures, onemay conclude that: (1) for all parameter values,
ME≻1 MA, MH≻1 MA and MI≻1 MH; and (2) MH≻1 ME if aN46.73t.
Hence, one can summarize firm 1's optimal decisions at the first stage
of the game as follows:
□ If 19tbab23.29t, firm 1 will decide to merge with firm 3 (M3) and
the final induced market structure this merger will lead to is MH=
{13, 24}.
□ If 23.29t≤ab63.55t, firm 1 will opt for merging with firm 2 (M2)
and the final induced market structure this merger will lead to is
MI={1234}.
□ If 63.55t≤ab470.92t, firm 1 will decide to merge with firm 3 (M3)
and the final induced market structure this merger will lead to is
MH={13, 24}.□ If instead a ≥470.92t, firm 1 will propose no merger (NM) since it
anticipates that nomerger would be accepted by the relevant AA in
the following stage of the game.
This completes proof of Proposition 2.
Appendix C. The assumed bargaining protocol
According to our bargaining protocol, two different types of cases
should be distinguished which we discuss in turn.
Suppose first that there is only one possible target firm. If this is the
case, then, if the target firm says “no” to the merger proposal, the
merger formation game stops and the final market structure is the
current one. This in turn implies that the outside option of the target
firm is exactly its profit in the current market structure. Take, for
instance, node 5 in Fig.1. At this specific node, firm 4may bid in a take-
it-or-leave-it manner for firm 123. Moreover, in case it decides to
make the bid, the bid price will be equal to the profit that firm 123
would make in market structure ME={123, 4}, i.e., Π123,ME. This
implies that firm 4 will, at this specific node, propose a merger to
monopoly if and only ifΠ1234,MI−Π123,MENΠ4,ME, which turns out to be
always true. Firm 4 always finds it profitable to merge with firm 123.
Consider now the situations in which the firm making the merger
proposal has two possible target firms.35 If this is the case, we assume
that if the (first approached) target firm says “no” to a merger
proposal, then the proposer can subsequently propose an alternative
merger to the other possible target firm. If, however, this second target
firm also rejects the merger proposal, then the merger formation
game stops.
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